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Introduction                                                                                                                                                        
The real financial crisis in the U.S. and in other countries did not take place in the banking or the 
wider  financial  sector  -yes  banks  and  others  financial  institutions  were  affected  by  their  own 
induced excessive lending schemes- but no, it seriously affected the individual households. More 
than  40% of  the  53  million  home  owners  who  had  a  mortgage  in  the  U.S.  were  affected  by 
foreclosure  proceedings  over  the  period  2004-2012.  Out  of  those  21.4  million  households  5.4 
million had their homes repossessed. Between 2006 and 2010 an additional 7.8 million Americans 
lost their jobs. Mainly as a result of the economic slowdown, between 2006 and to-day the U.S. 
government doubled its debts from $8.5 trillion till just below $17 trillion to-day. On top of this 
individual households lost $12.6 trillion in net worth in 2008, more than the total debt level on 
home mortgages in that year which stood at $10.5 trillion.
The  focus  of  many  economists  is  to  find  a  general  economic  equilibrium  and  to  study  the 
relationship between money supply,  inflation and economic growth levels. From above headline 
figures one can conclude that the U.S. economy was as far from a general equilibrium as one could 
possibly  imagine.  One  may  also  conclude  that  it  was  not  the  money  supply1 which  changed 
dramatically (M2, seasonally adjusted, grew by 4.7% in 2003, 5.96% in 2004, 4.5% in 2005 and 
5.76% in 2006), but rather the use of funds over the four years preceding 2008, which led to house 
price increases of over 30% in the three year period 2003-2005. It was the “abuse of funds” over the 
latter period which led to the subsequent losses in jobs, in incomes and net worth and in a reduction 
in economic growth rates which has lasted up till to-day. It was also one of the main causes of the 
growth in U.S. government debt over the last 7 years.
In this paper a “use of funds” theory will be developed, which will be based on actual economic 
developments, rather than on hypothetical links between money supply,  inflation,  and economic 
growth.
Emphasis  will  be  placed  on the  two main  long  term borrowing  levels  which  affect  individual 
households: home mortgages and government debt levels. The borrowing behaviour of the company 
sector will not be a subject of discussion as a misallocation of funds to these companies will usually 
lead to bankruptcy, which means the company seizes to exist. Neither individual households nor a 
government disappear in the same manner. 
Emphasis will also be placed on the costs of debt and the accumulation of savings in pension funds 
in this use of funds theory.  It will be demonstrated that issuing (part of) government debt in an 
index linked manner is an ideal tool to lower the costs of funding for the three countries under 
consideration: the Netherlands, the U.S. and the U.K. Such funding will also act as an anti-cyclical  
instrument in times of slow or negative economic growth. The negative interest rate effects on fixed 
rate bond portfolios as a consequence of discontinuing quantitative easing can be counteracted by 
temporarily increasing the volume of index linked bonds.
The aim of this paper is to provide  an insight into the links between lending activities, inflation, 
interest rates, economic growth and the ambition to provide for future incomes out of individual 
households own savings, rather than relying on a transfer system from those in work to those in 
retirement. 
1 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/M2SL.txt
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1. The macro-economic setting
For many years economists have been searching for the links between the money supply, inflation 
levels  and  economic  growth.  In  his  book:  Monetary  Theory  and  Policy2,  Prof  Carl  E.  Walsh 
provides an extensive overview of the many efforts of economists to search for a general economic 
equilibrium  and  to  quantify  the  relationships  between  money  supply,  inflation  and  economic 
growth.
General equilibrium theory studies supply and demand fundamentals in an economy with multiple 
markets, with the objective of proving that all prices are at equilibrium. The theory analyzes the 
mechanism by which the choices of economic agents are coordinated across all markets.
The problem with such supply and demand approach is that it automatically implies that the price 
set at the level where supply meets demand is a correct one. Human intervention through creating 
monopolies in certain markets and human errors in assessing correctly the “costs” of credits to a 
government or to individual households, turn the assumption that the price is always right upside 
down. 
What  economists  have  also  generally  assumed  is  that  inflation  is  measured  through  the  price 
changes in the costs of goods and services, the CPI or RPI price indices. Inflation does not only 
appear  in  the price for goods and services.  Inflation  -price  changes-  can occur  in fixed assets, 
especially  homes  and in  financial  assets  for  instance  in  share  prices,  but  also in  the  values  of 
derivatives.  The latter  price changes  have generally not  been taken into account  in  the models 
provided.
There are other factors of major importance which distort the relationships between money supply, 
inflation and economic growth. The first factor to be mentioned is the development of wages and 
salaries. Do they grow faster than inflation or slower and what are the causes of such speeding up or 
slowing down? The second major change, especially for the three countries under review, is the 
growth in savings in pension funds. Money gets locked up in financial assets and the return of such 
monies to the pension savers is no longer one of free choice, but one based on a set of government 
rules. Finally money in circulation is closely linked to the levels of credits granted to individual 
households, the company sector and a government. Losses - a destruction of savings- have a major 
effect on the behaviour of individual households and on governments when doubts arise about the 
repayment capacity over their outstanding debt. The timing when such losses appear can be years 
from the moment of granting the loans. A money loss, especially a write off of outstanding debt,  
represents  a  use  of  funds  loss.  The  ultimate  bearers  of  such  losses  are  always  the  individual  
households.  It  may  be  banks  or  pension  funds  which  may  have  to  write  down  the  values  of 
outstanding claims, but the ultimate owners of all assets of these organisations are the individual 
households.  A use of  funds theory recognises  the importance  of  such losses occurring  and the 
effects it has on lending levels, inflation and economic growth. Money supply theories do not show 
such losses.
It is symptomatic that in the excellent overview of current economic thinking the concepts of loan 
losses and credit risk management were not mentioned once in the book written by Prof Walsh. It is 
also symptomatic  that  when it  comes  to  interest  rates  there  seems to have been few efforts  to 
diversify such rates  according  to  the  assumed  maturity  periods  of  government  debt,  individual 
household  debt  and corporate  debt.  In  the  real  world such maturities  matter  and they (should) 
change the interest rates applicable to each type of debt.
2 http://people.ucsc.edu/~walshc/mtp3e/MTP_e3_toc.pdf
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The approach used in this paper does not start with the money supply but with the “use of funds” by 
individual households and by a government. It represents an effort to define a “use of funds theory”.
The company sector has been excluded for this purpose, not because this sector is not important, 
rather the opposite, but its actions are profit oriented. The ultimate penalty for a misallocation of 
financial  resources  by  companies  is  usually  bankruptcy,  the  disappearance  of  the  company. 
Individual households and a government will not disappear in the same manner. Neither, it appears, 
will some banks.
What  is  important  in  this  “use  of  funds”  theory  is  to  set  out  the  factors  which  influence  the 
collective  borrowing  behaviour  of  individual  households,  especially  the  long  term  borrowing 
actions. Secondly the “use of funds” theory will also study the relationship between the income 
levels of individual households and their debt obligations. This can be done on a macro scale as 
statistics to this effect are available in the U.S. and in the U.K. Last but not least it will study the 
debt accumulation of the three governments and the manner in which individual households have to 
pay for it and benefit from it.
The Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis produces on a quarterly basis a Balance Sheet of Households 
and Nonprofit Organizations3. These statistics have been produced over many years and provide a 
very valuable tool in analysing the collective behaviour of individual households.
2 The principal causes of the 2008 financial crisis
2.1 The use of funds approach to home mortgages
Making money available  to individual  households,  especially  of the long term variety of home 
mortgages, requires a judgement on the future repayment capabilities of each individual household. 
There  are  three  aspects  to  such  lending:  the  first  one  is  that  the  judgement  represents  a  risk 
assessment. A risk assessment is different from a price in that the applied price includes the risk 
premium over costs of funds over a long period. Only future developments will show whether the 
accepted price was the correct one. The 2008 financial crisis showed that in many cases the price 
was wrong or even more importantly that based on the income levels of some borrowers no price 
would  have  ever  matched  their  ability  to  repay  their  home  loans.  For  some  5.4  million  U.S. 
borrowers there was no equilibrium price. The second aspect is that the demand for homes is a finite 
one based on population growth and on the changes in the average household. The third aspect is 
that making money available for home mortgages can have two effects: the first one is that money 
enables families to acquire a home, but the second one is that if supply is not forthcoming in the 
short run in the places where families want to live, it drives up house prices. To lend money which 
is converted into increased house prices has less impact on economic growth than new construction; 
not only that, but one may question the economic value of rapid rises in house prices. The gain can 
have two potential causes: one it reflects the scarcity value, but two it represents a misallocation of 
funds as no economic gain -a gain in output in an economy- is made from the rise in house prices.  
The latter reflects closely the “black tulip” mania in Holland in the 17 th century, where speculation 
drove  up the black  tulip  price  to  3000 to 4150 guilders,  when a skilled  craftsman earned 300 
guilders a year.
3 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
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2.2 The U.S. experience
Over  the  period  2000-2006  in  the  United  States  the  combined  mortgage  debt  of  individual 
households increased from $4.814 trillion as per the year-end 2000 till $9.874 trillion as per the end 
of  2006,  an  increase  of  105.1%. Over  the  same period  the  median  income level  of  individual  
households moved up in nominal terms from $41,186 in 2000 till $47,262 in 2006, an increase of 
14.75%. If one takes into account the increase in the number of individual households from 104.705 
million  in  the  year  2000 till  114.384 million  in  2006 than the  average  amount  of  outstanding 
mortgage debt moved up from $45,977 in 2000 till $86,323 in 2006; an increase of 87.75%. The 
conclusion can be drawn that mortgage debt expanded by a factor practically six times faster than 
medium  income  levels.  This  excessive  speed  of  lending  for  home  buying  purposes  plus  the 
packaging of such home loans into daily trade-able mortgage backed securities lies at the heart of 
the causes for the 2008 financial crisis.
- The national home mortgage portfolio
The amounts of $4.8 trillion in 2000 and $9.9 trillion in 2006 represent the national home mortgage 
portfolio of the U.S. in these years. The quality of the national home mortgage portfolio is strongly 
influenced by the quality of the borrowers. The graph below4 shows the rapid growth of the sub 
prime share in new mortgage originations in the years 2004-2006.
Table 1:  Sub prime mortgage originations
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis
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In table 2 the annual outstanding mortgage amounts are reflected over the period 1996-2008 as well 
as the annual increase in outstanding mortgage amounts. Also included in the table are the house 
price inflation levels on a year over year base and the consumer price inflation levels5 over same 
period. Finally the excess of house price inflation over CPI has been displayed.
Table 2: Mortgages outstanding 1996-2008, annual increments in mortgage amounts, house 
price changes and consumer price inflation levels.
Year ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 2000 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 07 ‘08
Amount
x US $
trillion
3.54 3.75 4.05 4.43 4.81 5.30 6.26 6.91 7.81 8.91 9.90 10.58 10.5
Year on
Year
increase
x US$
billion
House
Price
Inflation
% y.o.y
CPI
Inflation
% y.o.y
Excess
HPI 
over
CPI
218
2.24
2.95
-0.7
216
5.10
2.29
2.81
301
4.61
1.53
3.08
377
5.81
2.16
3.65
383
7.67
3.25
4.42
507
6.04
2.77
3.27
705
6.48
1.56
4.92
882
7.29
2.23
5.06
944
11.08
2.59
8.49
1099
10.44
3.28
7.16
990
3.33
3.12
0.21
683
-1.95
2.77
-4.72
-57
-13.3
3.70
-17
- Credit judgement errors.
When individual households get into payment difficulties on their home mortgages, the first action 
by the lenders is foreclosure, followed by a foreclosure filing and subsequently home repossessions. 
U.S. statistics on all three can be found on the website of Statistic Brain6. The credit judgement 
problems took off in 2005 with the level of foreclosures increasing by 25% over 2004. In 2006 they 
5 http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
6 http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/
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were 90% higher than 2004 and in 2007 nearly 3.5 times the 640 000 level of 2004.The peak was 
reached in 2011 at 3,920,418 which stood at  over 6 times the 2004 level. All this led to home 
repossessions which numbered 269,000 in 2006, 489,000 in 2007, 679,000 in 2008, 945,000 in 
2009, 1,125,000 in 2010, 1,147,000 in 2011 and over 700,000 in 2012. All in all nearly 5.4 million 
credit judgement errors led to the ultimate repossession of homes. The number of households who 
had to deal  with foreclosure proceedings  amounted  to  21.4 million  households  over the period 
2004-2012. The Milken Institute7 estimated that in June 2008 there were 53 million households 
having a mortgage and 27 million were outright owners without any mortgage. Of the 53 million 
just over 40% had to deal with foreclosure proceedings during the 2004-2012 period; a staggering 
percentage, which really showed the extent of the financial crisis for individual households.
The credit  judgement  errors were compounded by the securitization  process,  which,  as table  1 
showed, really took off in 2003 when nearly two thirds of new home mortgage originations were 
farmed out to the financial markets. This meant that American financial institutions were able to 
generate mortgage sales, but did not need the financial reserves as the transactions were packaged 
and sold off to, among others, overseas banks and pension funds. It is noteworthy in this respect to 
note that the Bank of Spain, Spain’s central bank, did not allow Spanish banks to buy such U.S. 
mortgage  backed  bonds.  Regretfully,  it  did  not  stop  its  own country’s  mortgage  disaster.  The 
securitization method also made it very difficult to deal with individual clients as whole portfolios 
of  clients  were  simultaneously  declared  insolvent;  hence  the  enormous  numbers  of  foreclosure 
procedures compared to the number of households having a mortgage. 
- Demand for homes
The key determinant in the demand for homes is not the price but the growth in the number of 
individual households. In the period 2000-2010 the number of households grew in the U.S. from 
105.5 million to 116.7 million according to the Census Bureau8.  On average the U.S. increased the 
number of individual households by 1.12 million per annum over the period 2000-2010. Of the 
around  80  million  homes  used  all  year  around  in  the  U.S.,  the  average  lifespan  can  only  be 
estimated but is probably around 130 years, which means that the total finite demand for homes is 
somewhere around 1.7 million  new housing starts per annum. Table 3 gives an overview of realised 
annual new housing starts, seasonally adjusted for the period 2000-2013
Table 3: U.S. annual new housing starts9 per 1 July, seasonally adjusted over the period 2000-
2013
Year Housing starts
x 1,000
Year Housing starts
x 1,000
2000 1463 2007 1354
2001 1670 2008  923
2002 1655 2009  594
2003 1897 2010  546
2004 2002 2011  623
2005 2054 2012  741
2006 1737 2013 (1June)  836
Elements,  which “helped” individual  households to  acquire  homes,  were the applicable interest 
rates and other loan conditions attached to the mortgages. Low starts up interest rates were used to 
7 http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/riseandfallexcerpt.pdf
8 http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf
9 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/HOUST.txt
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entice  individual  households  to  sign  up  to  mortgages.  Such  mortgages  had  their  rates  steeply 
increased after a two year period. 100% mortgages were also used with no repayment obligations. 
In many cases short term funding rates were applied rather than a 30 year fixed rate. All these 
elements shifted the credit risks to the individual households. The latter only hoped that house price 
increases and incomes would grow faster than their payment obligations. When the lending excess 
came to the boil in 2008, such hopes were shattered and not only did house prices drop rapidly, also 
income  growth  stayed  behind  CPI  inflation  levels  and,  of  course,  the  outstanding  payment 
obligations remained the same as before the crisis. Individual households reacted in a way they 
could. They reduced the total volume of the outstanding national home mortgage portfolio from 
$10.5 trillion in 2008 till $ 9.38 trillion as per the end of the first quarter of 2013. During the latter 
period an increased share of households’ incomes was diverted to paying off home mortgages as 
compared to the allocations before the 2008 crisis. This change in income allocation through paying 
off mortgage debt and acquiring new homes from own income or savings reduced the spending 
power available for buying other goods and services. This had the effect that demand levels were 
reduced. The company sector reacted in slowing down employment growth and investments as well 
as generally following a wages and salary policy of keeping wage increases below price rises. 
Reduced growth rates in companies’ turnover levels and a slower growth in households’ incomes 
led to a rapidly increasing government debt level in all three countries involved.
- Conclusions
The conclusions, which can be drawn, are that excessive increases in home mortgage funding in 
2003-2005 led to excessive new housing starts,  which was simultaneously accompanied by the 
highest house price inflation seen for several decades. Income growth did not keep up with the 
excessive debt increases. When the home price levels started to get close to CPI levels, as they did 
in 2006 and when at the same time more households got into financial difficulties as shown by the 
increased level in foreclosures,  the market turned around, banks became more reluctant  to lend 
themselves  as  shown by the very high level  of securitisation  in  2004-2007.  The (international) 
financial  markets  absorbed  the  U.S.  home  mortgage  risks.  In  August  2008  some  banks  went 
bankrupt and others had to be rescued, including Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac as well  as AIG 
Holdings.  The latter  had  provided a  huge volume of  credit  default  swaps on mortgage  backed 
securities to the (international) financial markets.
Was the U.S. national home mortgage portfolio managed, so that these excesses could not have 
occurred? The answer is no. Could it have been managed, the answer is, of course, yes.  There was 
and still is no single authority in the U.S., the U.K. or the Netherlands which manages the national  
home mortgage  portfolio.   A penalty system for  lenders  and intermediaries  in  the lending and 
securitisation  process  does  not  exist,  at  times  when  such  lenders  and  intermediaries  caused 
excessive lending levels; excessive as compared to income developments of individual households. 
The  current  lack  of  a  national  home  mortgage  portfolio  management  system led  to  individual 
households being penalised either from foreclosures, from home repossessions or from drops in 
house prices after excessive gains as well as from an excessive increase in government debts as a 
consequence of negative or slow growth economies. Individual households are also penalised by 
average wage and salary increases below inflation levels. On top of all this they are also the ones 
who suffered the additional 7.8 million job losses and are responsible for paying back the $5.3 
trillion increase in U.S. government debt since the 2009 fiscal year.
A “use of funds” theory rather than a money supply theory has the benefit that it is able to explain 
why and how individual households’ incomes are affected by long term borrowing levels and what 
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it  does to  CPI inflation  and economic  growth rates.  This  leads  to the largest  borrowers of all: 
governments.
3. Government debt of the Netherlands, the U.S. and the U.K.
3.1 Volume factors
In a purely cash based society individual households could only buy those items which their income 
or  cash  based  savings  could  afford.  Governments  could  not  incur  any  debt  and  neither  could 
individual households or companies. Banks would not be needed. If an individual could not create 
an income through getting a job or being self employed, he or she would have no means to buy any 
goods or services and would have to depend on charity from others.
Developed economies have moved a long way away from this simple concept, especially through 
government and central bank actions. For instance in 1993 the U.S. government debt level stood at 
$4.35 trillion per end of June 1993 and increased to $16.74 trillion per end of June 2013. In the 
U.K. the government debt level was £202 billion in 1993 and had increased to £1.04 trillion per end 
of March 2013. In the Netherlands the government’s debt stood at Euro 83 billion in 1993 and is 
expected to reach Euro 451 billion in 2013.
Such an explosion of government debt raises a series of questions. The first one is one of debt  
maturity;  the second one of applied interest  rates and the third one is one about the individual 
households who have to carry the weight of government debt in the future.
3.2 Government debt maturity levels  
 
A subject which is rarely discussed in Parliaments is the maturity level of government debt. With 
the four to fivefold increase in government debt over the last 20 years, one can conclude that no 
progress has been made to reduce the debt level in any serious manner over this period. It will also 
be clear that continuing the trend line of the growth pattern in government debt levels over the next 
twenty  years  would  lead  to  a  debt  volume  which  would  seriously  disrupt  the  functioning  of 
economies. Funds which could otherwise have been used for increasing production and improving 
efficiency levels  in  the production sector  would be diverted  to  fund past  expenditure  levels  of 
governments, which did not take the difficult steps to bring tax income levels in line with their 
expenditure levels. Taking the current levels of government debt of the three countries as a starting 
point, it would require maturity periods of some 70 to 80 years before all debt could be cleared 
without  putting an unduly and unreasonable burden on the taxpayers  and thereby on economic 
growth.  The  individual  households’  debt  freedom  day  from  government  debt:  the  day  that 
individual households no longer have to pay to cover the expenses of a government over previous 
periods, is many years away.
With such lengthy maturity periods the funding of government debt should be put in focus. Two of 
the three governments mentioned: the U.K. and the U.S. have opted for issuing some index-linked 
government bonds. 
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3.2.1 Issuance of index linked bonds U.K. and U.S.
The U.K was the first country among the 12 major countries which issue index linked bonds. It 
started issuing such bonds: index linked gilts in 1981. In the U.K. such gilts are linked to the RPI 
index. Initially such link had an 8 months delay before inflation adjustments took place, but more 
recently this period has been shortened to 3 months. The aim of issuing such index linked gilts was 
to assist especially institutional investors like pension funds to manage their assets in line with their 
long term liabilities. The total outstanding volume of such gilts is around £380 billion out of the 
total government debt level of just over £1 trillion.
The U.S. introduced Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) in 1997. The U.S. Treasury10 
indicated  that  its  intention  is  to  maintain  the  portfolio  of  TIPS  at  around  10%  of  all  U.S. 
government debt outstanding to the public. The maturities of its TIPS are 5, 10 and 30 year bonds. 
They  can  be  bought  by  institutional  investors  as  well  as  by  individuals.  The  current  level  of 
outstanding TIPS is just over $1.1 trillion.
The question may be raised why countries practice such different approaches to issuing index linked 
bonds compared to total government debt outstanding with the public? The U.K. maintains a level 
of around 38%, the U.S. of 10% and the Netherlands of 0%. In the next three tables it will be 
illustrated that over long periods of time issuing a much larger proportion of government debt in 
index  linked  bonds  would  have  been  cheaper  for  the  countries  and  its  taxpayers  concerned. 
Secondly, at times of economic hardship, it would equally have been effective as an anti-cyclical 
instrument. Thirdly it may solve the dilemma of rising interest rates after quantitative easing will be 
stopped.
3.2.2 Historical overview of long term fixed rate bond yields with CPI and index linked bonds
         for the Netherlands, the U.K. and the U.S.
Table 4: the Netherlands
Year 5 longest
Dutch
Govt. bond
Yields %
CPI
%
Effective
Yield
%
Index
Linked
Yield
%
Year 5 longest
Dutch
Govt. bond
Yields %
CPI
%
Effective
Yield
%
Index
Linked 
Yield
%
1993 6.69 2.61 4.08 3.61 2004 4.14 1.12 3.02 2.12
1994 7.20 2.64 4.56 3.64 2005 3.44 2.04 1.40 3.04
1995 7.19 1.68 5.51 2.68 2006 3.86 1.00 2.86 2.00
1996 6.49 2.29 4.20 3.29 2007 4.33 1.87 2.46 2.87
1997 5.80 2.32 3.48 3.32 2008 4.36 1.94 2.42 2.94
1998 4.87 1.78 3.09 2.78 2009 4.03 1.11 2.92 2.11
1999 4.92 2.15 2.77 3.15 2010 3.79 1.93 1.86 2.93
2000 5.51 2.60 2.91 3.60 2011 4.31 2.38 1.93 3.38
2001 5.17 4.15 1.02 5.15 2012 3.06 2.90 0.16 3.90
2002 4.99 2.75 2.24 3.75 2013 2.00 (est.)
2003 4.27 1.70 2.57 2.70
10http://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prod_tips_glance.htm
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For all three countries an index linked yield of 1% over CPI (or in the U.K case RPI) inflation level 
was chosen for bonds maturing in 30 years. For the Netherlands it was, of course, a theoretical yield 
as no index linked bonds have been issued by the Dutch government. There is a second caveat and 
that is that the index linked yield reflects the yield that both new bond issues and existing ones 
receive. As index linked bonds can be regarded as the best hedge against the risks of CPI inflation,  
the assumption was made that they are kept to maturity rather than being subject to a daily mark to 
market practice. The latter practice is only useful for short term fixed rate bond traders as their 
objective is to make gains (or losses) in trading such bonds.  The average index linked bonds would 
have yielded 3.5% over the period 1993-2002. Over the period 2003-2012 the average yield would 
have been 2.8%. From all the years, only in 2012 was the index linked yield above the long term 
government bond yield. In 9 years was the index linked yield even below the effective yield. If one 
considers that institutional investors would have been very satisfied with a guaranteed yield of 1% 
over  inflation,  than the Dutch government  would have been much better  off  if  it  had issued a 
sizeable proportion of its debt in index linked yields and so would have been the Dutch taxpayers.  
Long term debt would not require the premiums covering the risks of inflation, which the effective 
yields show.  The elimination of such risks by issuing index linked bonds would have brought the 
overall costs of funds to the Dutch government down by a very sizeable percentage. The exception 
year  would  have  been  2012,  but  with  a  negative  growth  rate  of  minus  3/4%,  such  a  positive 
contribution to the savers could be regarded as an anti cyclical cash injection into the economy. 
Many pension  funds  would  not  have  had  to  cut  their  pension  payments,  which  in  themselves 
constitute a drain on the purchasing power for the retired and thereby for an economy.
Table 5: The United Kingdom experience, average 10 year gilt yield, Retail Price Index (RPI), 
the effective yield after inflation and new issues of 30 year index linked gilts.
Year 10 year
Average
Gilt  yield 
%
R.P.I. Effective 
Yield
%
Index
Linked
Gilts 
%
Year 10 year
Average
Gilt yield
%
R.P.I. Effective 
Yield
%
Index 
Linked
Gilts
%
1993 7.69 1.9 5.79 2.1 2004 4.79 3.5 1.29 4.5
1994 8.18 2.9 5.28 3.9 2005 4.45 2.2 2.25 3.2
1995 8.24 3.2 5.04 4.2 2006 4.24 4.4 - 0.16 5.4
1996 8.03 2.5 5.53 3.5 2007 4.62 4.0 0.62 5.0
1997 7.15 3.6 3.55 4.6 2008 4.60 0.9 3.70 1.9
1998 5.59 2.8 2.79 3.6 2009 4.54 2.4 2.14 3.4
1999 4.87 1.8 3.07 2.8 2010 4.66 4.8 - 0.12 5.8
2000 4.93 2.9 2.03 3.9 2011 4.38 4.8 - 0.42 5.8
2001 4.99 0.9 4.09 1.9 2012 3.77 3.1 0.67 4.1
2002 5.04 2.9 2.14 3.9 2013 2.9(est.)
2003 4.87 2.8 2.07 3.9
The experience of the U.K. is different from the Netherlands in that in 2006 and 2007 and in 2010 
and 2011 it had very high RPI inflation levels, far above the remainder years. The index linked gilts 
yield is based on new and existing gilts issued of this type with a margin of 1% over R.P.I. The 
average yield over index linked gilts over the period 1993 till 2002 would have been 3.44% and 
assuming that such gilts  are being held to maturity,  the costs to the Treasury and therefore the 
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British Taxpayer would have been substantially lower than the 10 year average gilt yield. Even over 
the period 2003-2012 the 10 year average gilt yield would have been more expensive at 4.5% than 
the index-linked average yield of 4.3%. When a government is able to keep inflation levels low, it  
works to the advantage of issuing index-linked gilts. In section 4.2 the case study of the Bank of 
England’s own pension fund will be raised. One policy action -quantitative easing- by both the 
Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve was to buy up mainly fixed rate government bonds 
over the period 2009-2012. This influenced the price of such bonds, the interest yields over the 
outstanding bonds, plus the CPI or RPI inflation levels.
Table 6: The U.S. experience
Year 10 year
Average
Bond yield
%
C.P.I Effective
Yield
%
30 Year
Tips yield
%
Year 10 year
Average
Bond yield
%
C.P.I. Effective
Yield
%
30 year
Tips yield
%
1993 6.26 2.99 3.27 3.99 2004 4.30 2.59 1.77 3.59
1994 6.90 2.56 4.34 3.56 2005 4.13 3.28 0.85 4.28
1995 6.74 2.83 3.91 3.83 2006 4.52 3.12 1.40 4.12
1996 6.07 2.95 3.12 3.95 2007 4.30 2.77 1.53 3.77
1997 6.10 2.29 3.81 3.29 2008 3.18 3.70 -0.52 4.70
1998 5.18 1.53 3.65 2.53 2009 3.16 -0.36 3.52 0.64
1999 5.64 2.16 3.48 3.16 2010 3.60 1.61 1.99 2.61
2000 5.75 3.25 2.50 4.25 2011 2.67 3.06 - 0.39 4.06
2001 5.06 2.77 2.29 3.77 2012 1.92 2.03 -0.11 3.03
2002 4.64 1.56 3.08 2.56 2013 2.50
1 July
1.67 0.83 2.67
2003 4.23 2.23 2.00 3.23
The  U.S.  case  is  quite  similar  to  the  two  other  countries  in  that  if  a  larger  proportion  of  its 
government debt would have been issued in TIPS, especially of the 30 year variety, it would have 
saved the government and thereby the taxpayers a substantial amount of US dollars. With pension 
reserves at over $16 trillion as per the end of March 3013, the $1.1 trillion in TIPS seems a very low 
percentage of total debt. Also in the U.S. in the period 2008 till to-day the 30 year TIPS rate would 
have acted as an economic stabiliser as it would not have been affected by quantitative easing, but 
only by CPI inflation levels.
3.2.3 Conclusions
The case for index-linked bonds seems very clear. By transferring the inflation risk back to the 
taxpayers, the respective government on behalf of its tax payers in all three countries will save itself 
substantial amounts if it chooses for a higher the percentage of its debt to be issued in index linked 
bonds. The 20 year experience as set in tables 4-6 for the Netherlands, the U.K. and the U.S. shows 
how expensive it has been to use fixed rate bonds, which do not protect against the inflation risks. 
The financial markets require a compensation for such risks. Their risk price has historically been 
much  higher  than  in  case  the  government  would  take  over  such  risks  as  can  be  seen  in  the 
differences between the 10 year fixed rate bond yields and the 30 years TIPS yield or the equivalent  
in other countries.  Quantitative easing has exacerbated the price setting in especially fixed rate 
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government bonds by changing the supply-demand relationship and thereby lowering the yields. 
Once the reverse process gets started, the U.K. and the U.S. governments will find that the yield 
will go up and many fixed rate bond holders will experience substantial losses on their portfolios. 
An alternative way to get out of the foreseeable loss situation for many fixed rate bondholders once 
interest  rates  will  start  to  go  up  is  for  governments  to  temporarily  increase  the  percentage  of 
government bonds issued as index linked. The key conclusion out of the above is that fixed yields 
are variable due to the interest rate and inflation expectations and the variable index linked bonds 
are fixed with their  yield fixed to a variable -inflation level-  which turns the total  result  into a 
foreseeable fix at 1% over inflation. The conclusion which can be drawn from the 20 year overview 
is that index linked bonds lower the costs of government borrowings substantially, but help long 
term  investors  at  times  of  economic  hardship,  which  in  itself  helps  economic  growth.  The 
readjustment to more normal interest rates once quantitative easing is reversed will cause serious 
losses over existing fixed rate bond portfolios.  A solution would be to temporarily increase the 
issuance of more index linked government bonds rather than relying on more fixed rate ones.
4 Pension funds: the Netherlands, the U.K. and the U.S
4.1 The growth in pension funds assets
In a book by Clark and Munnell: The Handbook of Pensions11, Chapter 23 written by Ian Tonks, it 
was stated that as of 1996 the total pension assets in the Netherlands were $349 billion or 89% of 
GDP, for the U.K $966 billion which represented 76% of GDP and for the United States $4.763 
trillion which was 62% of GDP. According to Towers Watson pensions study 201312 the Dutch 
pension savings have reached $1.199 trillion or 156% of GDP, the U.K. pension savings $2.736 
trillion or 112% of GDP and in the U.S. 16.851 trillion or 108% of GDP.  Such assets are a major 
change in the savings landscape as individual savers have no say over the use of funds as the rules 
of  use  is  controlled  by government  regulations.  The growth in  such assets  needs  a  rethink  by 
economists  about  the economic  effects  of  delegating  the decisions  over  the adequacy of  assets 
versus  liabilities  to  people  who  do  not  own  the  financial  resources.  The  easiest  manner  to 
demonstrate such effects is by using an extreme example: the Bank of England’s pension fund.
4.2 The Bank of England’s pension fund
The Bank of England defined benefit pension fund13 stands out from all pension funds in that in 
2012 94.7% of its pension reserves of just over £ 3 billion were invested in index linked bonds; 
£2.459 billion in government bonds (gilts) and £ 400.1 million in corporate index linked bonds. 
Such asset allocation raises a series of interesting issues.
The future income of this pension fund is uncertain, but the certainty is that its income will always 
be in excess of RPI inflation levels.   The current  value of the future pension liabilities  is  also 
uncertain as it depends on the life expectancy of the pension fund participants, but also on inflation 
levels. The changes in life expectancy for the Bank of England’s pension fund population can be 
properly assessed by an actuary. What actuaries cannot know and neither can any other person is 
how future inflation levels will develop.  What the actuaries and the pension trustees of this pension 
fund will know though is that their future liabilities can be met from current assets in as far as the 
11 http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199272464.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199272464
12 http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2013/01/Global-Pensions-Asset-
Study-2013
13 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/humanresources/pensionreport.pdf
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inflation effect is concerned. For a defined benefit promise, which is increasing the pay-out at least 
in line with the RPI index, to have financial assets which perform such function is invaluable. What 
actuaries and the pension trustees cannot do is to put an uncertain inflation development into a fixed 
discount percentage. In the case of the Bank of England’s pension fund 3% was used as the discount 
rate. In financial terms, history is no guide to uncertain future developments and one may put great 
question marks over the 3% used if it was only to cover future inflation levels.
The Bank of England’s pension fund is a great exception to the many pension funds in the world 
due to their financial  asset base. However this pension fund -as well as all others including the 
pension supervisors- grapples with the problem of how to find the correct manner to discount future 
liabilities into a current liability figure and compare this to the asset base of a pension fund. It is 
especially the development of inflation rates which makes all  the difference for defined benefit 
schemes. Many companies have closed their defined benefit schemes as they became unwilling to 
bear the risks of inflation out of corporate profits.  In the case of defined contribution schemes the 
pension pot saver carries the full impact and risks of inflation. In all schemes the monthly coverage 
ratio is used as the guideline to decide on any changes in the pay-out figures. In my view and only 
considering it from an inflation perspective, there is and can be no accurate prediction of inflation 
rates over a 30 or more year period. A natural hedge has been applied by the Bank of England’s  
pension fund, but this fund is lucky to have found such a hedge. 
5 An overall balance: conclusions
The real reason that the U.S., the U.K. and the Netherlands are out of balance is that managing debt  
levels to individual households was never seen as a policy objective. Most economists started from 
the money supply data, rather than from a use of funds philosophy. The latter incorporates income 
level developments and compares it to the volume of lending to individual households, especially of 
the long term variety of home mortgages. The use of funds philosophy also incorporates the many 
errors which were made by financial institutions in granting loans to individual households who 
could not afford to pay back such loans. Such loan losses had a cumulative effect far greater than 
the  amounts  lost  as  it  changed  individual  households’  behaviour  in  their  spending  patterns. 
Subsequently  it  changed  the  corporate  behaviour  due  to  reduced  demand  levels  as  well  as 
government behaviour due to the escalating government debts.
There are other reasons as well. Central banks are supposed to maintain the value of the currency, 
which means to keep inflation levels low. Currently inflation levels are only based on current prices 
for goods and services: the real sector. They are not based on price developments of fixed and 
financial assets and liabilities, notwithstanding that there are strong links between the value of a 
currency and the latter price developments. Inflation does not restrict itself to goods and services. 
With a great ambition to save for future incomes through individual pension savings, the current 
and the future have become closely interlinked. This ambition has changed the character of the 
balance between the real sector and the financial sector, whereby the rapid growth in government 
debt has added to the weight of the financial sector.
An overall balance in an economy cannot be reached on basis of the markets functioning perfectly. 
Human intervention and human errors make this  impossible.  Therefore human understanding is 
needed,  initially  to  comprehend  which  are  the  key  drivers  of  human  behaviour,  especially  of 
individual  households  and of  a  government  and subsequently what  can  be  done to  restore  the 
balance. My conclusion based on the data provided in this paper is that individual households are 
the  key  decision  makers  in  an  economy,  rather  than  companies  or  the  government.  However 
collectively, individual households can make mistakes about their collective borrowing levels. The 
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two  most  important  borrowing  exposures  are:  mortgage  debt  and government  debt  levels.  For 
individual households in the countries in the Euro zone, these are not cross-border exposures but 
purely domestic debt servicing obligations. The most serious mistake is to over estimate the ability 
to take on debt faster than the income growth of individual households. Therefore economies need a 
sensible national home mortgage portfolio management system, which avoids lending excesses. The 
first requirement for all three countries is to put one entity in overall control. As it involves lending, 
the most likely candidate would be the national central banks. The second requirement is not to 
punish  the  individual  borrowers  (and the  rest  of  the  economy)  by  raising  their  costs  of  funds 
through an interest rate increase but by penalising the lenders’ and intermediaries’ profit levels. In 
the Netherlands the DNB could not raise interest rates anyway as the ECB takes the interest rate 
decisions on the Euro. Home mortgages and government debt levels are the most domestic of all 
financial  products  as  they  are  nearly  totally  restricted  to  citizens  of  the  country  concerned. 
Therefore the DNB, the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve could be given the powers to 
install a traffic light system for managing the national home mortgage portfolio: green for continue 
what banks and intermediaries are doing on the home mortgage front; amber for slow down and 
finally red for an imposition of a fines system for those institutions exceeding the speed limit. By 
increasing the costs of lending at the point of origin, it will affect the availability level of mortgages 
without seriously affecting the price.
The second element of managing an economy is managing the government debt portfolio. Both the 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have been influencing the price of fixed rate bonds by 
buying up substantial quantities of outstanding government debt and especially in the Fed’s case 
other bonds as well. The Bank of England has bought up £ 375 billion of mainly fixed rate bonds 
and the Fed about $2 trillion of various bonds, but mainly fixed rate government bonds. Again the 
way back is not to punish those who still hold fixed rate bonds, but to temporarily increase the level 
of index linked bonds in the new issues. Another option is to swap the fixed rate bonds in the  
central bank’s coffers and replace them by index linked bonds. The latter bonds could be gradually 
sold back to the financial markets.
Finally the third main question of managing an economy is to wonder how the adjustment period 
could be speeded up. In a number of previous papers I have suggested to start “economic easing” 
for a short period of time; a period of one to two years.  In the above the rapid growth in pension 
fund reserves was mentioned. Such pension savings represent the savings of individual households 
for future consumption. Individual households have no longer a say over when to use such savings. 
However the effectiveness of these savings is closely related to the performance - the economic 
growth rates- of an economy. Share prices, bond yields, commodity prices and for whole economies 
the exchange rates depend on the success to create full employment and stable long term economic 
growth rates. What pension funds are currently unable to do collectively is to speed up income 
transfers on a temporary basis when collectively individual households have over estimated their 
long term borrowing capacity. Rather than waiting for an adjustment period to sort itself out and see 
simultaneously government debt increase rapidly, it makes sense to shorten the adjustment period 
drastically. The main limitation is that individual households cannot do it on their own as they no 
longer have control over their own main savings instrument: the pension savings. It is however in 
everyone’s interest that the reductions in demand as a consequence of this over borrowing process 
are neutralised. This can be done by giving all pension savers a short term cash injection out of their 
own pension pots. The amounts needed are relatively small as compared to the total size of the 
accumulated pension savings. For the Netherlands it would be about 2/3 of 1%, for the U.K. about 
7/8 of 1% and for the U.S. about 1%. Such cash injections can be spread out over four quarterly  
instalments and can be equally distributed over the young and old pension savers. The young will  
have to save for the longest periods and run the highest investment risks.  If all receivers of such 
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funds are encouraged to spend these funds not on reducing debt but on spending on goods and 
services, than companies will start employing new staff and investing more. If companies have the 
certainty that such cash injections will be repeated till countries have reduced their unemployment 
levels to pre-crisis levels, then the company sector will start planning long term expansions. The 
pension funds will experience an improvement in their exposure to the company sector as profits 
will  increase.  Individual  households  will  not  see  their  debt  levels  increase  and  a  government 
benefits from the higher level of economic activity through increased tax income and reduced social 
security payments. This leaves the question what do pension funds get out of it. They firstly benefit  
from the economic upturn through company profits and share prices, including those of banks who 
see their doubtful debtors level reduced. Secondly to have a chance to a future pay-out, many more 
individuals will likely join pension funds as only those in the schemes will benefit. Thirdly there is 
the uncertainty whether economic easing will fully repay itself,  in other words whether pension 
funds will not be worth off after the cash outlay. The governments of the three countries concerned 
could provide a top up guarantee in case, say after 3 years, the original amount plus the reward 
based on the return of index linked bonds has not been fully recuperated. 
Economic easing will turn out to work much faster and cheaper than executing an infrastructure 
plan. For infrastructure, which is really needed, the plans and their execution should always take 
place  irrespective  of  the  state  of  the  economy.  However  the  planning  stages  and  subsequent 
implementation often takes many years which make such plans not very suitable for relatively short  
term economic interventions. A reality check for these plans will show that governments (i.e. the 
taxpayers) will need to borrow substantial amounts to implement such plans. This adds more debt to 
the already overburdened individual households.
Drs Kees De Koning
Chorleywood, U.K.
5th August 2013
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